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Abstract 
This study examines the Lost Cause of the Confederacy and the reasons 
for the defeat of the Confederate States of America. The Confederate States of America 
was created with propaganda, lofty ideals and unbridled optimism. With the outcome of 
the American Civil War known, this study seeks to answer the question, was the 
South's defeat predetermined, or was it a victim of its own leadership? On the surface 
the Confederacy seemed unprepared for war with the North in 1861. The Confederate 
leadership suffered from unreasonable and delusional expectations without any realistic 
plan for success. The South was partially a victim of its own propaganda and the 
propaganda was also misused and ill timed. The cause of the Confederacy was in many 
ways a comedy of errors. The dreams of success and independence held by the 
Confederacy were unlikely to be realized given the lack of manpower, infrastructure, 
economic diversity, industry, political strength, political alliances, and unity. In addition 
to the tangible deficits of the South, the Confederacy was also engaged in a struggle to 
create a nation while simultaneously waging war against an established nation. Each of 
these tasks was daunting by itself, but to tackle all together was an incredibly difficult 
undertaking. Such an undertaking would only be possible if the entire Confederate 
nation was united in ideology and purpose, however, it was not. 
.. ·····-------------
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Introduction 
This essay will examine the central causes for the defeat of the Confederate army 
and the Confederate failure to win foreign recognition. Several issues will be examined in 
this study including southern deficits in manpower, industry, infrastructure, economic 
diversity, political strength, political alliances and national unity. At issue is the question, 
did these deficits doom the Confederacy to failure from the start or did the political and 
propaganda miscues undermine the chances for Confederate victory? The fact is that the 
Confederacy could not sustain a prolonged war and prevail. The deficits of the 
Confederacy were too great to overcome without foreign assistance and battlefield 
victories to shore up the moral of the South while weakening the will of the North and as 
history shows, it was not to be. 
Chapter one examines the South's deficits in manpower and infrastructure. 
The South failed to take into account the population disparity between the North and the 
South as well as the South's reluctance to utilize the one source of manpower that they 
did have: slaves. In the first modem war, the South failed to recognize the holes in its 
infrastructure and the consequences that would have for the Confederate war effort. The 
lack of a uniform and connected rail system and limited number of warships made it 
impossible to match the ability of the North to wage a modem war. What little 
infrastructure did exist in the South was all geared towards the transportation of cotton to 
the coastal regions for shipment overseas. The patchwork of mismatched rail lines and I I 
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large gaps in the lines did not make moving troops along the Confederate border with the 
North quick or simple. The result of these deficits was a logistical nightmare for the 
southern leadership and an impaired ability to fight a sustained war. 
Chapter two examines the economic shortcomings of the Confederacy. 
The lack of economic diversity and industry, were extremely detrimental to the South as 
the war dragged on. The agricultural nature of the South meant that the population was 
small and spread out. The fixation of the South on cotton rather than staple food crops led 
to food shortages in areas of the South that were not easily accessible by rail. The lack of 
industry in the southern states also made it ditlicult to fight a prolonged war. While the 
industrial North was easily able to repair and replace the materials needed to fight a 
modern war, the South was struggling to create the industry it needed to support its own 
war effort. The South started the war at a distinct disadvantage in industry that 
manufactured the machines, arms and munitions that were needed to fight a modern war. 
Chapter three explores the political deficiencies of the Confederacy. They 
lacked a strong central government to run and fund a prolonged war. They lacked political 
alliances. None were secured before engaging in war with the statistically superior North. 
The Confederate propaganda machine failed to obtain the desired results. The South 
possessed a flawed battle plan and failed to unifY. When the South should have been 
creating a sense of nationalism under the banner of the Confederacy, the majority of 
southerners were more loyal to their state than they were to their new nation. 
Chapter I 
The American Civil War was the first war that saw railroads used as 
the primary mode of transportation of troops and supplies. In this area the North was 
at a distinct advantage. While the South had nearly nine-thousand miles of railroad 
track within its borders, the North had a staggering twenty-two thousand miles of 
track within its borders. In addition to the sheer amount of track the North had it also 
had the benefit of being both uniform in size and more strategically placed than was 
the South.' The South because of its strong belief in state's rights was more 
individualistic and less uniform in the building of its rail lines. The lines were varied 
in gauge and incomplete. By having three different gauges of rails, the South was 
unable to use what rail lines it had effectively. Since a locomotive that ran on 5'0" 
could not run on a track gauge of 4'81/2'' or the 5'6" gauge used in other parts of the 
South, the rail lines that existed in the South were ineffective for the transportation of 
troops to the battlefields. 2 
In addition to the obvious difficulty of non-standard rail gauges, the 
fact that the rails were designed for commerce rather than military purposes meant 
that the rails were oriented towards the shipping of cotton rather than movement of 
'University of Virginia: Hagley Library, Technology and the Civil War: A Digital Resource. 
2 University of Virginia: Hagley Library, Technology and the Civil War: A Digital Resource. 
2 
men and supplies. The result was that there were numerous gaps in the Confederate 
rail system that made troop and supply movements more difficult and time consuming 
than they were in the North. Only two rail lines ran East to West in the Confederacy 
linking Richmond and the Mississippi River at the start of the war.3 This fact made 
troop movements westward more complicated and time consuming as it involved 
changing rail lines and required an indirect route to the western battlefields for the 
Confederate forces based in the East. 
In September of 1862, when General Longstreet was ordered to take 
his troops to Chickamauga Creek, Georgia from Northern Virginia the lack of rail 
structure became apparent. Longstreet and his 12,000 men were forced to take a 900 
mile excursion changing rail lines at least eight and possibly ten times in order to 
reach the essentially 550 mile destination.< The deficits in Southern transportation 
were already taking a toll on the Confederate army and limiting its effectiveness. 
From the start of the war, the North was much more equipped to make rapid troop 
deployments than the South was. In a modern war, the benefits of rapid troop 
movement were incalculable. 
The effective transportation of the Southern Army was also 
complicated by the independence of the individual Southern railroad companies. The 
3 University of Virginia: Hagley Library, Technology and the Civil War. 
4 McPherson, James, Battle Cry of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 671. 
high value placed on state's rights made it impossible to consolidate the railroad 
resources of the Confederacy for effective use by the military. While the North had 
created the United States Military Railroad in 1862 to solve their railroad logistical 
problems, the Confederate government failed to take even moderate control of the 
railroads within their borders until February 28, 1865.' The reluctance of the 
Confederate government to exert control over the Southern railroads put the military 
at a significant disadvantage to their Northern counterparts. 
Given that the majority of the Civil War was fought on Southern soil, 
the inability to control and expand the Southern rail system proved to be a fatal flaw 
in the Confederate war machine. The Northern industrial power meant that there was 
no shortage of machinery or raw materials to create and maintain the Northern rail 
lines. In the South however, this was not the case. At the start of the war, the North 
had twice the amount of rails per square mile that the South had and was responsible 
for the production of93 percent of the nation's iron! The combination of control and 
support for the railroads in the North was something that the South never came close 
to achieving during the war. 
In the South, the railroads that did exist were extremely primitive and 
poorly maintained. As Southern rail lines were damaged by warfare or sabotage they 
5 Turner, Charles W., "The Virginia Central Railroad at War, 1861-1865," The Journal of Southern 
History, VoL 12, No.4 (Nov., 1946), p. 510-533. 
6 McPherson, James, Battle Cry of Freedom. p. 318. 
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could not be easily repaired since the rails either came from the North or overseas. 
The South tried to create an iron industry to fulfill its needs but never came close to 
being able to produce enough iron to replace the rails that were being damaged much 
less add new rails to increase the reach of Southern railroads. Likewise replacement 
parts for the railcars came from the same locations and were equally inaccessible 
during the war.7 
The South also suffered from a serious deficit in skilled labor to run the 
railroads. While the North made certain that their rail system was manned by 
professionals who knew how to run, manage and maintain their vast rail system, the 
South made no such assurance until the Spring of 1864. At this time the Confederate 
government finally passed an act that exempted some skilled railroad workers from 
military service in an effort to try to prop up the failing Southern rail system. 8 Labor 
and manpower shortages were the two greatest challenges that the South faced during 
the Civil War. 
Similar difficulties were faced by the Confederacy in building and 
maintaining its Navy. Since only two of the ten Navy yards in the United States in 
1860 were within the Southern borders, the Confederacy was at a distinct 
7 Black, Robert C., "The Railroads of Georgia in the Confederate War Effort," The Journal of 
Southern History, Vol. 13, No.4 (Nov., 1947), p. 511-534. 
8 Turner, p. 510-533. 
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disadvantage on the waters. 9 In the same way that the South suffered from deficits in 
machinery and iron, for the railroads, the shipbuilding industry was also hamstrung. 
The South had plenty of wood and sawmills for manufacturing wooden ships but, as 
the Ironclad warships became the military standard, the South was unprepared and 
unable to match the manufacturing capabilities of the North." 
While the South did have some small iron foundries within its borders, 
none of them were capable of producing the two inch iron plated required for building 
ironclad vessels at the onset of the war. Even more damning was the fact that the 
South did not have any facilities that were suitable for producing the machinery 
needed for the new ironclad warships. Similarly, the South had no ordinance 
producing facilities within its borders. At the outbreak of war, nearly all naval 
ordinance was produced in Washington and there is no indication that the South 
produced any naval guns or cannons. 11 
Even if the South had been able to build a shipbuilding industry 
capable of meeting its needs, the lack of raw materials would still have made their 
effectiveness minimal. Given the lack of effective transportation in the South, 
obtaining and shipping materials and machinery necessary for the production of ships 
9 Still, William N. Jr., "Facilities for the Construction of War Vessels in the Confederacy," The 
Journal of Southern History, Vol. 31, No.3 (Aug., 1965), p. 285. 
10 Still, 287-288. 
II Still, 288. 
was a daunting task. Even the limited amount of resources and materials that the 
Confederacy did manage to acquire were often unable to reach their destinations 
because of the fragmented rail lines and the inability of the South to protect, rebuild 
and maintain the rails. 12 
6 
In spite of the setbacks and adversities, the South did manage to 
construct some "twenty shipyards, five ordinance factories, two naval machinery 
shops and one powder works."13 The creation of such an extensive naval 
manufacturing project during war was an impressive accomplishment. Unfortunately 
for the South, the lack of materials for powder manufacture made the production of 
naval guns and carmons an exercise in futility. The limited availability of rolled iron 
for armor plating also meant that numerous Confederate ironclad warships would 
remain unfinished. Time and raw materials would negate the amazing industrial 
accomplishments of the Confederacy. The constant retreating in the face of Northern 
advancements would mean that unfinished warships would need to be either moved to 
areas of security or, as was more common, those ships would be destroyed so they 
would not fall into the hands ofthe enemy.14 
The greatest naval accomplishment by the Confederacy was the 
capture of the Navy Yard at Norfolk. There the Confederate ironclad, the Virginia was 
12 Still, 291-292. 
13 Still, 304. 
14 Still, 303-304. 
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born after converting the frigate, Merrimack into an ironclad ramming vessel. 15 The 
seizing of the Norfolk Ship Yard gave the Confederacy some one-thousand pieces of 
heavy ordinance which was the primary source of heavy ordinance for the entire 
Confederacy. This ordinance was quickly shipped throughout the South to arm its 
warships. 16 The CSS Virginia would prove to be the most valuable ship in the 
Confederate Navy as the famous battle between the CSS Virginia and the USS 
Monitor would prove. Though each side would claim victory in the stalemate of the 
first battle between two ironclad warships, for the Confederacy this was certainly a 
triumph for an agricultural nation to have produced such a ship and to have engaged 
in the first such battle. 
The Civil War was an example of modem warfare because naval ships 
were used to support ground forces rather than merely for ship to ship combat. So 
important was the gunfire of the Union ships against Confederate ground forces that 
General Lee opted to pull back, from the coastal regions in Georgia and Carolina in 
order to avoid the devastating fire from Union vessels. Naval fire made such an 
impression on Lee that beginning in early 1862, all of Lee's offensive operations 
would take place out of the range of the Union's naval guns. 17 
15 Military Affairs, "River Navies in the Civil War," Military Affairs, Vol. 18, No. I (Spring, I 954), p. 
29-32. 
16 Still, 299-300. 
17 Anderson, Bern, "The Naval Strategy of the Civil War," Military Affairs, Vol. 26, No. I (Spring, 
1962), p.14. 
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The value of the Navy was the main reason that the Confederacy, 
despite the lack of resources, attempted to construct some twenty-six ironclads to aid 
in its defense and break the Union blockade. Even with the setbacks and shortages, at 
least thirteen of these did see action during the war. In the end however, the Jack of 
resources, the strength of the Union Navy, the stranglehold of the blockade, and the 
shortage of manpower would allow the North to dominate the rivers and coastal areas 
in the South. While the North was able to replace any of it's losses of men and 
material, the South could ill afford the long and costly war of attrition that the Civil 
War became.18 
In 1860 the North had two and one-halftimes the population of the 
South, including the three and one-half million slaves held in the South. If the slaves 
were taken out ofthe equation that advantage on the part of the North becomes closer 
to four to one. 19 The South's extreme deficits in manpower and industry would be 
magnified by the nature of the world's first modem war. In a war that saw between 
600,000 and 700,000 deaths, the South was unable to withstand the war of attrition.20 
The Union was able to amass an army that was between 2,500,000 and 
2,750,000 strong while the South could only muster between 750,000 and 1,250,000. 
18 Anderson, 20. 
19 McPherson, James, Battle Cry of Freedom. 852- 854. 
20 McPherson. 854. 
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Due to poor records the real strength of the Confederate army is uncertain but even 
with the higher estimate, the South was outnumbered by more than two to one.21 In a 
war of attrition, numbers are the deciding factor and the inability of the South to 
replace their troop losses would doom the Confederacy. The proof of this fact is in the 
numbers. While the Union lost an estimated 360,000 men to disease and battlefield 
casualties and the South lost an estimated 260,000 men, the Union was far less 
impacted by the losses due to their larger army and higher overall population. 22 
Mortality was greater among Confederate wounded, because of inferior medical 
service. While the exact number of civilian casualties related to the Civil War are 
unknown the addition of even a conservative estimate of those casualties would drive 
the total death rate for the Civil War to equal all other United States wars combined 
through Vietnam.23 
In the same way the South could not replace their locomotives and 
infrastructure as the North could, they could not replace their dead soldiers either. 
These deficits in manpower and industry would spell doom for the Confederate States 
of America. As the war dragged on into a war of attrition, the South had too many 
deficiencies to survive. Perhaps the first issue to weaken the South was the lack of a 
powerful central government to unif'y their fledgling nation in order to orchestrate a 
21 McPherson, 773-853. 
22 McPherson, 775-854 .. 
23 McPherson, 854. 
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modern war. 
Cotton was so important to the South that the embattled nation "raised 
two armies, one for war that was made up of the majority of white southerners 
between the ages of seventeen and fifty and a second army, almost as large to grow 
cotton made up of mostly slaves. "24 The manpower of the second army could have 
been better used to assist the war effort by growing food or performing tasks that had 
to be performed by the military. The use of slaves by the military or the government 
was always opposed by the southern planters who saw their wealth as their slaves and 
their land. "The patriotic planters would willingly send their flesh and blood to the 
army but not their slaves." This conflict would continue throughout the war. "In 1864 
when Robert E. Lee declared the immediate necessity for the service of 5,000 negroes 
for thirty days, the planters objected vigorously, essentially handicapping the 
Confederacy's ability to wage war."" The southern planters put their own economic 
needs above those of their new nation. The southern planters found it more palatable 
to part with their family members than their slave property in their struggle for 
sovereignty for the South. 
The reluctance of the southern planters to allow their slaves to be used 
by the army for the war effort led the Confederacy to introduce conscription and 
24 Lebergott, Stanley, "Why the South Lost," p. 62-63. 
25 Lebergott, p. 62-63. 
!I 
impressments of slaves in order to try to meet its needs?6 The impressments and 
conscriptions were never sufficient to meet the needs of the Confederate military, and 
were often met by resistance from the planters who would work to politically block 
such attempts." The devotion of the South to growing cotton during the war not only 
drained resources from the war effort but also served to keep cotton prices from rising 
in the South as the Confederacy had hoped they would." Had the Confederacy cut 
cotton production and withheld cotton as the leadership had envisioned, France and 
Great Britain may have been more apt to provide aid to the South. This strategy would 
have taken time however, as the huge 1860 crop had left Great Britain flush with 
cotton at the start of the war.29 For the Confederate strategy to work, there had to be a 
unity of purpose that only a strong central govermnent could muster. 
26 Trexler, Harrison A., "The Opposition of Planters to the Employment of Slaves as Laborers by the 
. Confederacy," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VoL 27, No.2 (Sept., 1940), p. 211-224. 
27 Trexler, p. 213-214. 
28 Lebergott, p. 64-65. 
29 Lebergott, p. 62-66. 
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Chapter II 
The first issue that must be examined in a study of the economic 
preparedness of the Confederacy for war with the North is the over-reliance on "King 
Cotton." The South held the dominant position in the world cotton market in the 
antebellum years. 1nis dominance led to the belief by Confederate leaders to believe 
that the monopoly of cotton would translate into political might. The idea that cotton 
was king was a theme that was echoed throughout the South and fueled expectations 
of victory and independence. 30 
The South allowed commercial thoughts and agendas to enter the 
political and military arenas. The belief that a cotton embargo would force Europe to 
come to the aid of the Confederacy was rooted in the "King Cotton" mentality. The 
rationale for this belief was that the monopoly of the cotton market put the South at 
the top of the world economy and thus the world economy would suffer if the South 
held back cotton shipments to Europe for even one year?1 Southerners believed that 
Great Britain was so dependent on the South's cotton that it "would be brought to its 
30 Lebergott, Stanley, "Why fue Soufu Lost: Commercial Purpose in fue Confederacy, 1861-1865," 
The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 70, No. 1 (June, 1983), p. 58-59. 
31 Lebergott, Stanley, "Why fue South Lost: Commercial Purpose in fue Confederacy, 861-1865," The 
Journal of Southern History, Vol. 70, No. I (June, 1983), p. 58-59. 
knees by the South decisively withholding cotton."" The blind belief in that 
philosophy doomed the Confederacy from the start. 
13 
Unfortunately for the South, South Carolina continued to ship cotton to 
Great Britain even after it seceded from the Union. The Confederacy, despite its 
reliance on withholding cotton from Europe, never passed any legislation to ensure 
that cotton would be universally embargoed. 33 Since the South was essentially a one 
product economy, there was no incentive for individual cotton growers to hold back 
their product. The lack of economic diversity was a quandary that plagued the 
Confederacy throughout the war. 
For the South, there was no Plan B. So much emphasis was placed on 
the power of "King Cotton" that little or no consideration was given to what they 
would do if withholding cotton failed to bring aid from Europe. The South hinged its 
entire fate on the power of cotton. In 1858 Senator James Henry Hammond of South 
Carolina replied to Senator William H. Seward ofNew York: 
"Without the firing of a gun, without drawing a sword, should they 
[Northerners] make war upon us [Southerners], we could bring the 
whole world to our feet. What would happen if no cotton was furnished 
32 Lebergott, p. 60. 
33 Lebergott, p. 61. 
for three years? .. England would topple headlong and carry the whole 
civilized world with her. No, you dare not make war on cotton! No 
power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton is King. "34 
14 
The reliance on "King Cotton," obscured the reality that, the southern planters 
were deeply in debt to northern merchants and banks. Thus, while rallying behind the 
main cash crop of the Confederate States, the South was actually struggling to survive 
from the start of hostilities. While the South appeared to be prosperous on the surface, 
the reality was that the Confederate States held only "30 percent of the national 
wealth (in the form of real and personal property), they had only 12 percent of the 
circulating currency and 21 percent of the banking assets. "35 In essence, the prosperity 
of the South was vastly overstated and dependent on the banking institutions of the 
North for their survival. Cotton and slaves were only valuable if the South could tum 
them into money and money was a commodity that the South had little of. The wealth 
of the South was not liquid as was the industrial North. Southern wealth was tied to 
the land and the future sale of cotton. Northern banks were the machine that buoyed 
the South by extending credit and assigning value to the non-liquid assets of the 
southern planters. 
The South also struggled with developing a national tax system and 
means of funding the government and the war. The fact that most of the South's 
34 The University ofNorth Carolina Collection, The Papers of James Henry Hammond 
35 McPherson, James, Battle Cry of Freedom, 437. 
15 
assets were non-liquid made raising money from the sale of Confederate bonds 
insufficient for meeting the financial needs of the Confederacy. Most of the assets of 
the South were in the form of land and slaves and thus, were not useful to the 
Confederate government as a means of raising funds. 36 
The Confederate government realized quickly that while the southern 
people might lack cash, they did possess cotton. The realization that cotton could 
replace cash in the short term, led the Confederate government to adapt the machinery 
for levying taxes to use the promises of planters to pledge portions of their cotton crop 
sales to the government in exchange for Confeder::tte bonds. The problem was that, 
the Confederate government had no preexisting tax collection system that could be 
adapted to the cotton system, one had to be created. A second problem that became 
apparent was that, some planters failed to follow through on their pledges and instead 
sold their cotton on the open market or illegally to northern consumers." The end 
result was that the Confederacy was never able to meet the financial needs and goals 
of the Confederate government. The lack of economic diversity that existed in the 
prewar South did not help the Confederate government buttress its economic health. 
Considering the lack of industry in the South at the time of the Civil 
War, the failure to ensure a steady flow of goods from Europe to wage their war of 
independence was a very serious mistake on the part of the South. Since the only 
military materials that the South had at their disposal at the onset of war were those 
36 McPherson, James, Battle Cry of Freedom. 437. 
37 McPherson, James, Battle Cry of Freedom, 438. 
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seized in the arsenals they took over, their stores of munitions and arms was limited 
from the start. None of the arsenals south of Virginia even had the machinery 
necessary to produce arms and ordinance thus, the South began a war without the 
means to replace or produce the materials needed to wage war.38 
The lack of industry in the South meant that the Confederacy had to 
create a military industrial complex from scratch, while simultaneously waging war. 
While the South performed incredible feats in creating many arsenals to manufacture 
arms and ordinance within Southern borders, the lack of preexisting industry, 
underdeveloped natural resources, and the inefficient and discounected infrastructure 
of the South made this work slow and difficult. 39 The railroads in the South proved to 
be the greatest problem for Confederate progress and transportation. The South also 
suffered from serious economic deficiencies. The lack of liquid assets and banking 
institutions put the South at a tremendous disadvantage to the diversified and 
industrialized North. The reliance on the power of "king cotton," and the failure of the 
southern leaders to ensure the economic stability of their fledgling nation doomed the 
Confederacy from the start. 
38 Cappon, Lester J ., "A Note on Confederate Ordnance Records," The Journal of the American 
Military Institute, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer, 1940), p. 94-102. 
39 Cappon, Lester J., "A Note on Confederate Ordnance Records," p. 97. 
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Chapter III 
The main obstacle to a united Confederacy was, the Confederacy itself. With 
the ideal of states rights and democracy as its binding force, the South hamstrung 
itself from the beginning. From the very beginning, the Confederate government 
created a Constitution that was similar to the American Constitution, however, the 
Confederate Constitution sought to bolster the conservatism that had weakened in the 
Union and it emphasized states rights over a strong central government.40 The 
Confederate leadership failed to ensure alliances with France and Great Britain 
despite their goal of gaining foreign recognition of their sovereign status. The 
Confederate government made numerous comparisons between their struggle for 
independence and the American Revolution however, they did not make the crucial 
alliances with foreign powers that the founding fathers did. The Confederacy was at a 
disadvantage in military strategy compared with their northern foe. While the North 
was relatively unified in their purpose and strategy, the South was a divided nation 
with more weight given to the needs of the individual states than to the needs of the 
Confederacy as a whole. 
The clearest indicator of the value of state's rights in the Confederate 
Constitution was in the fact that the issue of slavery, which had such a profound effect 
on the decision to secede from the Union in the first place, is not established by the 
Confederate Constitution. The issue of slavery is left up to the individual states within 
40 Hattaway and Beringer, 26-27 and The University of Tennessee, Constitution of the 
Confederate States of America. 
18 
the Confederacy. The guarantee of protection for slave property is however, found in 
three places within the Confederate Constitution. In article I, section 8, the 
Confederate Constitution stated that "No ... Jaw denying or impairing the right of 
property in negro slaves shall be passed." In article 4, section 2, the Confederate 
Constitution guarantees that "the citizens of each state ... shall have the right to transit 
and sojourn in any state of this Confederacy, with their slaves ... ; and the right of 
property in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired." Finally, in article 4, section 3, 
"in all such territory, the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists in the 
Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected by Congress and the territorial 
government."41 This, ensured that any new territory added to the Confederate States of 
America would be open to the institution of slavery. 
The reason that the issue of slavery and State's rights was so central to 
the Constitution of the Confederate States of America lay largely in the fact that the 
South was predominantly rural and agricultural land under the control of a relatively 
small number of elite agricultural magnates. The South was at a distinct disadvantage 
to the North in every facet of national valuation. The South had few rail lines, few 
sizable cities, poor roads and little industrial development as compared to the North. 
No matter how the numbers are aligned, the South appeared much weaker than the 
41 Hattaway and Beringer, 26-27 and The University of Tennessee, Constitution of the 
Confederate States of America. 
19 
North.42 The numbers however, did not guarantee the outcome of the war. As the 
American Revolution proved, a numerically inferior force, can win, if the desire is 
strong enough and the strategy is sound enough to overcome the disadvantage. In 
order for this outcome to be had however, the weaker side must have, "strong 
leadership, and firm determination among its people, there must be superior strategic 
decisions efficiently and effectively executed and most importantly, the people's will 
to continue the struggle must be maintained."" The key to this strategy is unity. The 
Confederacy however, was far from united. Early in the war President Davis was 
keenly aware of a division between the upper and lower southern states and he 
worked feverishly to mend any dissention and maintain a united South.44 The 
emphasis on State's rights over national loyalty would make the efforts of President 
Davis woefully inadequate. The individualistic and regional tendencies of the 
southern establishment were too deeply ingrained in the southern ethos to be undone 
in time to assist the war effort. 
From a military standpoint, the cordon strategy of defense utilized by 
the Confederate military was a poor choice for a nation divided by insufficient 
infrastructure, rails and roads. The cordon strategy required the Confederate armies to 
fight a defensive war along its entire border with the North. The concept of fighting a 
defensive war is risky to say the least and is more so when the border that is to be 
42 Hattaway and Beringer, 34-35. 
43 Hattaway and Beringer, 3 5. 
44 Rice University Collection, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, val. 1-12. 
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defended is both expansive and disconnected. As previously noted, the South was a 
hodgepodge of incompatible rail lines and the transportation of troops from the east to 
the west was a difficult and time consuming process. While the North could freely 
and rapidly shuttle its troops along the border with the South, the Confederate military 
faced a logistical nightmare to position its troops to block the northern advances.45 
Perhaps because many of the southern secessionists believed that the North 
would not oppose the separation, there was little thought given to the need for a 
centralized government with the power, money, and authority to wage a full-scale 
war. This miscalculation by the Confederacy was a major problem once war had 
begun. Lacking a united front to wage such a prolonged war, the Confederacy instead 
relied on overly optimistic assessments of their military strength and value to the 
world economy.46 To further exacerbate the shortcomings of the South, they also 
underestimated the might and resolve of the North. 
By believing that the North "lacked the courage and motivation to fight 
a prolonged war, the South also failed to comprehend the need for foreign aid and 
45 Hattaway and Berringer, 34-35. 
46 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy: Popular Notions and International 
Realities," The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 32, No.2 (May, 1966), p. 151-171. 
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recognition of sovereignty."47 Historian Henry Blumenthal cites three viewpoints that 
adversely affected the Confederacy from the start. The first, is the "King Cotton" 
diplomacy previously mentioned. The second, was the overly optimistic view that 
Europe would eagerly and swiftly recognize the South due to a shared dislike of 
Yankee political and commercial policies. The third viewpoint was that the 
Confederacy could and would succeed on its own and thus would not need to become 
dependent on foreign powers." The commonality among these views was that victory 
would lead to recognition and a sovereign South would be born. Though overly 
optimistic and simplistic, these three views were enthusiastically embraced by the 
majority of southern leaders in the antebellum and early years of the war. 
The Confederate leadership were so certain of the correctness of their 
beliefs that any vague indication of support from foreign nations was taken as gospel 
and used to justify their optimism and belief in southern victory.49 Recognition 
seemed to be the ultimate prize that the Confederacy desired and the courting of 
French and British merchants in the years preceding secession fed the belief that 
recognition would be forthcoming. 50 The commonalities between the southern 
plantation owners and the British aristocracy seemed to indicate that a co-operative 
47 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 151. 
48 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 152. 
49 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 154. 
50 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 155. 
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economic alliance could be formed that would lead to a political alliance between 
Britain and the South. The Southern leadership believed that Britain's need for cotton 
to fuel its booming textile industry, would equate to support for the South in order to 
stave off financial ruin. The South believed that the British fleet would actively 
oppose the northern blockade of the South to ensure that the flow of cotton to Britain 
would continue unimpeded." 
President Davis tried many different methods to achieve recognition of 
his fledgling nation, but most revolved around cotton. He often portrayed the South as 
a peaceful nation merely seeking its independence from a tyrannical northern 
aggressor. He attempted to get the world to see the Confederacy as a moderate and 
civilized administration in search of recognition as a peaceful and sovereign nation. 52 
Unfortunately for Davis, he portrayed the South as too powerful and too independent 
to warrant the immediate aid from the foreign powers that could have assisted his 
government in achieving independence. "As late as November 7, 1864, Davis told the 
Confederate Congress that all he desired was recognition, believing that despite the 
precarious position the South was in, it would bolster the morale of the Confederate 
people and embolden those northerners who favored peace."" 
51 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 155-156. 
52 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 156. 
53 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 157. 
With peace not forthcoming, the Confederacy focused their attention 
on breaking the Union blockade. As President Davis stated in his second inaugural 
address to the Congress of the Confederate States on November 18, 1861: 
The Confederacy was feeling the effects of the strangulating 
Anaconda strategy of the North in 1864. The South desperately 
needed to get supplies from abroad and the Union blockade was 
making that difficult. Davis only exacerbated the situation in his 
repeated calls for foreign nations to ignore what he referred to as the 
"ineffective blockade." Feeling that such views must be taken by the 
neutral nations of the Earth, I have caused the evidence to be 
collected which proves completely the utter inefficiency of the 
proclaimed blockade of our coast and shall direct it to be laid before 
such Governments as shall afford us the means of being heard-- But 
But although we should be benefitted by the enforcement of this law 
so solemnly declared by the great Powers of Europe, we are not 
dependent on that enforcement for the successful prosecution of the 
war. As long as hostilities continue the Confederate States will 
exhibit a steadily increasing capacity to furnish their troops with 
food, clothing and arms. 54 
54 Rice University, Jefferson Davis' Second Inaugural Address to Congress 
of the Confederate States, Richmond November 18th 1861. 
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As Blumenthal puts it, "The Davis administration with an apparent genius for 
accomplishing the opposite of what it intended, described the blockade 
extraordinarily inappropriately. An ineffective blockade justified less intervention 
than an effective one."" This failure was a part of the great comedy of errors that 
came to mark the Davis administration and the folly of the Lost Cause. 
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The Confederacy next tried to capitalize on the blockade by creating 
artificial cotton scarcity to prod Europe into action. They burned cotton crops and 
tried to make the blockade seem more effective. Once again the South fell to the 
fallacy that "cotton was king" and the sooner that Europe felt deprived of it, the 
sooner they would come to the aid of the South. These attempts to pressure Europe all 
failed, perhaps it was just too little, too late. 56 
The next step was to warn Europe that a Northern victory would lead 
to Northern aggression against Canada and Mexico. This constituted a not so subtle 
threat that Yankee aggression would not end with the demise of the South, which 
backfired, as it only served to make Britain and France more wary of provoking the 
United States and hurting their own trade interests. It may also have made the 
European powers believe that, if the North was so aggressive, that they may 
compensate for the loss of the South by moving northward. In either case it was in 
55 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 157. 
56 Blumenthal, p. 157. 
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Europe's best interest to remain neutral and certainly not be seen as giving aid to the 
South." 
Unfortunately for the South, they realized far too late that they required 
much more foreign assistance than they had originally believed. It was only as the war 
dragged on and the Union blockade took its toll on the Southern economy and its 
ability to sustain itself, that the Confederacy saw the need for a diplomatic solution. 58 
Another unforeseen result of the blockade was the increasing efforts of Britain and 
France to cultivate cotton tmder their control in India and Algeria as well as the 
increasing use of wool and linen. Cotton was no longer kin:g and the South never had 
the power they believed they had. 59 
By early 1863 it seemed that the minority of Confederates including 
Vice-President Stephens were correct in their belief that it was an illusion to count on 
Europe's co-operation to gain recognition. That Confederate minority believed that a 
predatory Europe would welcome a war between the North and South that would 
ravage and deplete the two nations to their benefit. The military might of the North 
and South as well as their modern weaponry and ironclad warships was extremely 
threatening to the European powers. The threat they posed to European colonies kept 
57 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. !58. 
58 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 158. 
59 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. !59. 
Europe from antagonizing the United States. The only way for the South to gain 
recognition was through victory and offensive operations in the North.60 
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The problem with the Confederate plans for victory to gain recognition 
was that Jefferson Davis felt that any escalation of hostilities in the North by the 
South would be returned several fold by the North. The rationale of the militant 
Southerners was that their army was "invincible" and thus victory was the only result 
they could fathom. Ironically it was likely the "boastful" references by the 
Southerners to their military might and invincibility that kept Britain and France from 
coming to the aid of the Confederacy early in the war.61 Once again the Confederate 
government had achieved the opposite of what it intended by using a flawed 
diplomatic strategy. Why would Britain or France feel compelled to come to the aid 
of the South, if the South could stand on their own? Why would they take the risks or 
losses associated with warfare if it was not necessary? Furthermore, "it is well 
documented that many in the British and French governments believed the Southern 
boasts and felt the North would not be able to conquer the South."" The South was a 
victim of their own propaganda and failed to accomplish their goals. A weaker South 
would have attracted more foreign assistance and intervention than a strong South. 
In spite of the frequent comparisons of the South's struggle for independence 
60 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. l60-l6l. 
61 Blmnenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 162. 
62 B1mnentha1, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 162. 
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and the American Revolution, the Confederacy failed to court foreign assistance from 
the beginning.63 Only as the tide turned against the South did the Confederacy actively 
seek foreign aid and by then it was too late. As the conclusion of Jefferson Davis' 
second inaugural address to Congress shows, the Southern government became 
victims of their own rhetoric. 
"While the war which is waged to take from us 
the right of self-government can never attain that end, it 
remains to be seen how far it may work a revolution in the 
industrial system of the world, which may carry carry 
suffering to other lands contemporaneously with as well as 
to our own. In the meantime we shall continue this struggle 
in humble dependence upon Providence from whose 
searching scrutiny we cannot conceal the secrets of our 
hearts, and to whose rule we confidently submit our 
destinies. For the rest we shall depend upon ourselves -
Liberty is always won where there exists the unconquerable 
will to be free, and we have reason to know the strength that 
is given by a conscious sense, not only of the magnitude, but 
of the righteousness of our cause."64 
63 Rice University Collection, Jefferson Davis' Speech at Richmond, Spotswood Hotel, 
June I, 1861 
64 Rice University, Jefferson Davis· Second Inaugural Address to Congress of the 
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The political miscalculations and overly optimistic beliefs held by the South ensured 
that foreign aid would not materialize. The failure of the Confederacy to use their 
cotton crops to their advantage by leveraging their stores for goods from Europe 
meant that Europe had no vested interest in helping protect the cotton stores of the 
South." 
Jefferson Davis acknowledges that the foreign intervention that the 
Confederate leadership was hoping for was in all likelihood not to be, in his 
communication to the Confederate Congress on May 2, 1864 in which he states: 
In considering the state of the country, the reflection is 
naturally suggested, that this is the third Congress of 
the Confederate States of America. The provisional 
Government was formed, its Congress held four 
sessions, lived its appointed term, and passed away. 
The permanent Government was then organised, its 
different Departments established, a Congress elected 
which also held four sessions, served its full 
Confederate States, Richmond November 18th 1861. 
65 Blumenthal, Henry, "Confederate Diplomacy," p. 160-164. 
constitutional term, and expired. You, the second 
Congress under the permanent Government, are now 
assembled at the time and place appointed by law for 
commencing your session. All these events have 
passed into history, notwithstanding the threat of our 
prompt subjugation made three years ago by a people 
that presume to assert a title to govern States whose 
separate and independent sovereignty was recognised 
by treaty with France and Great Britain in the last 
century, and remained unquestioned for nearly three 
generations.66 
Davis further states in his address that the war was forced upon the South by 
northern aggression. 
Yet these very governments, in disregard of duty and 
treaty obligations which bind them to recognise as 
independent, Virginia and other Confederate States, 
persist in countenancing by moral influence, if not in 
aiding by unfair and partial action, the claim set up by 
the Executive of a foreign government, to exercise 
66 Rice University Collection, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, val. 1-
12. 
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despotic sway over the States thus recognised, and 
treat the invasion of them by their former limited and 
special agent, as though it were the attempt of a 
Sovereign to suppress a rebellion against lawful 
authority. Ungenerous advantage has been taken of our 
present condition, and our rights have been violated, 
our vessels of war detained in ports to which they had 
been invited by proclamations of neutrality, and in one 
instance our flag also insulted where the sacred right of 
asylum was supposed to be secure; while one of these 
governments has contented itself with simply 
deprecating by deferential representations the conduct 
of our enemy in the constantly recurring instances of 
his contemptuous disregard of neutral rights and 
flagrant violations of public law. 67 
Davis goes on to illustrate his misunderstanding of the situation that his fledgling 
government was in in his statement to the Confederate Congress on May 2, 1864: 
It may be that foreign governments, like our enemies, 
have mistaken our desire for peace unreservedly 
expressed, for evidence of exhaustion, and have thence 
67 Rice University Collection, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, val. 1-
12. 
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inferred the probability of success in the effort to 
subjugate or exterminate the millions of human beings 
who in these States prefer any fate to submission to 
their savage assailants. I see no prospect of an early 
change in the course heretofore pursued by these 
governments; but when this delusion shall have been 
dispelled, and when our independence, by the valor 
and fortitude of our people, shall have been won 
against all the hostile influences combined against us, 
and can no longer be ignored by open foes or professed 
neutrals, this war will have left with its proud 
memories, a record of many wrongs which it may not 
misbecome us to forgive, some for which we may not 
properly forbear from demanding redress. In the 
meantime it is enough for us to know that every 
avenue of negotiation is closed against us: that our 
enemy is making renewed and strenuous efforts for our 
destruction, and that the sole resource for us as a 
people secure in the justice of our cause, and holding 
our liberties to be more precious than all other earthly 
possessions, is to combine and apply every available 
31 
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element of power for their defence and preservation. "68 
Despite the statements made by Davis in his address, the South failed to unify 
the elements that they did possess for the good of the Confederacy and its war effort. 
Time after time, the good of the individual state or individual planter took precedent 
over the needs of the Confederacy. Individualism and individual economic prosperity 
hurt the Confederacy throughout the war. 
The North had a powerful President with the authority to fight a war 
and bring the Union together her for a common goal of bringing the South back into 
the United States of America. The South by contrast was a deeply divided nation with 
a weak central government and operated more like a loose affiliation of states than a 
united nation. This division in the South was rooted in its commitment to state's 
rights and commercial interests. While the Confederacy spoke of united commitment 
to the cause of rebellion, their actions were quite different. 
Beginning with the failure of the Confederacy to take control and 
capitalize on it's biggest asset, namely slaves, the South allowed the plantation 
owners to exert more power than the government. 69 The failure of the Confederate 
government to take control of the cotton stores and trade also put the planters 
68 Rice University Collection, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, val. 1-12. 
69 Trexler, Harrison A., "The Opposition of Planters," p. 213-214. 
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financial concerns above that of the South as a whole. 70 The seeds of destruction were 
planted right in the Constitution of the Confederacy. 
The Confederate Constitution vested all of the power to raise funds, 
collect taxes, control trade, to raise and maintain armies, to mint and establish the 
value of money, to declare war, to make laws and to decide how money will be spent 
in Congress. Worse, all of these powers were based on a two-thirds majority vote in 
the Confederate Congress. Without a two-thirds majority, no aetions could be taken. 
The President of the Confederacy was limited even in times of war from exercising 
any authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces without the two-thirds 
majority vote in the Congress." 
The need for a two-thirds majority vote in the Confederate Congress 
would make it difficult for President Davis to make swift and critical decisions 
regarding the fast paced modem war the South was engaged in. Congress by nature 
was a divided entity driven by the concerns of each member's individual state. Unlike 
the North, where Congress served as a check on the power of the President, in the 
South, Congress was the power. The problem was, that the power of Congress in the 
South was not unified with a common purpose. Each state sought to ensure the 
survival and prosperity of itself, often at the expense of the Confederacy as a whole. 
South Carolina continuing to ship cotton after it seceded in order to ensure its own 
70 Lebergott, Stanley, "Why the South Lost," p. 62-66. 
71 The University of Tennessee, Constitution of the Confederate States of America. 
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prosperity despite the Confederate government's belief in the power of King Cotton 
and the need to starve Great Britain and France so that they would come to the aid of 
the South to ensure that cotton would flow again. 72 Regional pride, regional interests, 
and regional armies made it difficult if not impossible for the Confederacy to fight a 
unified war. 
Further exacerbating the problem of division within the Confederacy 
was the fact that the South was struggling to create a nation while waging war. 
Confederate identity and nationalism were constructed out of a combination of 
institutions, rhetoric and symbols. But, contrary to what many historians argue, the 
construction or creation of Confederate nationalism was not a major problem. The 
speed with which white Southerners, shed their American identity and came to see 
themselves as Confederates, was amazing. Southern whites embraced the idea of a 
Confederacy with a fury and seldom looked back. Where Confederates struggled, and 
suffered the aches of their new national identity, was in building an institutional 
framework and unified structure for the nation. Thus, each challenge to the national 
government, whether it came in the form of political squabbling, class resentment, 
material needs, or desertion, was perceived as a crisis of epic proportions, as 
illustrated in Davis' speech at Macon, Georgia on September 23, 1864: 
It is not proper for me to speak of the number of men in 
72 Lebergott, Stanley, "Wby the South Lost," p. 60. 
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the field. But this I will say, that two-thirds of our men 
are absent - some sick, some wounded, but most of them 
absent without leave. If one-half the men now absent 
without leave will return to duty, we can defeat the 
enemy. With that hope I am going to the front. I may not 
realize this hope, but I know there are men there who 
have looked death in the face too often to despond now. 
Let no one despond. Let no one distrust, and remember 
that if genius is the beau ideal, hope is the reality.73 
Despite acknowledging the problems facing the Confederacy, Davis still 
believes that victory is within the grasp of the South. The propaganda that the 
southern leaders expounded became the very hope, that they clung to in the face of 
adversity. As Davis states in his address, he believes that any bit of hope will 
somehow turn the tide of war in favor of the South. The reality was that it would take 
foreign intervention or a dramatic turn of events for the South to have any chance at 
victory. 
Problems that an established nation like the Union could handle with 
ease, seemed far more damaging and threatening to a Confederate nation fighting for 
its survival. And as history would show, the Confederate nation ultimately could not 
withstand a combination of internal and external problems and pressures, and 
73 Rice University Collection, Jefferson Davis' Speech at Macon, 
Georgia. September 23, 1864. 
eventually collapsed in April, 1865.74 
74 Rubin, Sarah Anne, A Shattered Nation: The Rise and Fall of the 
Confederacy.l861-1868." (North Carolina: University ofNortb Carolina Press, 2005). 
Introduction. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the South was unprepared for war in 1861 but 
historians cannot know for certain that this doomed the Confederacy. Southern 
attitudes and ideology helped ensure that unprepared ness would be combined with a 
fatal rush to war and overconfidence. The deficits in manpower, industry, and 
infrastructure were all understated by the Southern government. The Confederate 
government had the same information available to them that historians have today and 
thus, knew that the North was stronger in terms of manpower, infrastructure, 
resources, and industry, yet the decision was made to go to war. Knowing the 
strengths of their enemy and the weaknesses of their own fledgling nation, why go on 
the offensive at Fort Sumter? Why rush into a war with a strong and established 
nation before the Confederate nation had been fully created? The reason for urgency 
can be understood in terms of the southern mindset and quasi-aristocratic culture. 
The Confederacy was born of unrealistic expectations and misguided 
beliefs. The belief that the southern gentleman was the equivalent of British 
aristocracy fostered a fictive kinship that carried far more weight in the minds of the 
southern elites than it did in the minds of their British counterparts. The southern 
leadership also failed to comprehend the difference between the British merchant 
support and the British government's position on the issue of support and recognition 
of the Confederacy. The Confederacy built its strategy on false assumptions and poor 
diplomacy. Looking at the eause of the Confederacy holistically however, the 
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outcome of the Civil War was not a foregone conclusion. There were opportunities 
for success and ultimate victory that the South failed to capitalize on because of their 
shortsightedness and rush to war. 
From the belief that the North was unwilling to fight, to the belief that 
the. world revolved around cotton, the Confederate strategy was ill-conceived. The 
weakness of the Southern government made it impossible to forge a unified 
economic, political, diplomatic and military strategy. In order to win the war, the 
South would have had to prepare before going to war, instead, they struggled to 
prepare during the war. Time was not on their side. 
The South was obviously aware of the materials, industry, resources, 
and manpower that the North had and the South did not, yet the South still went to 
war in 1861. This does not speak to the preparedness of the Confederacy. This speaks 
to the Quixotic mindset of a group of militant idealists who fail to comprehend the 
irrationality of their actions. Thus, it can only be concluded that the South was wholly 
unprepared for war with the North, and the southern leadership failed to adapt to the 
circumstances that they were faced with. For all of the comparisons that the 
Confederate leadership made between their struggle for independence and the 
American Revolution, they failed to utilize the same strategies that the Founding 
Fathers used. The Confederate leadership did not actively pursue foreign alliances and 
get assurances of recognition for their fledgling nation until it was too late. 
The South was at a great disadvantage to the North in every category of 
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evaluation. The South had no Navy or shipbuilding facilities within their borders at 
the start of the war. The Confederacy had little industry with which to produce the 
materials and armaments required to wage war before the start of hostilities. The rail 
system that existed in the South on the eve of war was disconnected, incompatible, 
unfinished and inadequate to support a military defense of their border with the North. 
The Confederacy lacked the unified front required to build a strong and cohesive 
government that could wage a modem war and develop foreign alliances. In spite of 
the deficiencies that plagued the South, the leadership rushed towards war. 
Had the South taken a different approach to their struggle for 
independence, the outcome may have been very different. In the end however, the 
opportunities for victory and recognition were missed or squandered by the 
Confederate leadership. Opportunities on the battlefield as well as in political circles 
were lost by the Confederate leadership and the end result was the defeat of the 
Confederate States of America. 
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